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Introduction 
 
Financial crises have become part of the economic landscape around the world and in 
Latin America in particular. Substantial effort is being nowadays devoted to understand 
and prevent crises, but less work has been advanced on their economic consequences. 
The conventional wisdom has been that crises inflict profound and lasting, harmful 
effects throughout the economy, yet only fragmentary evidence is available. This chapter 
is aimed to fill this void by bringing forward an integrated analysis of the different 
channels through which financial crises can hit the economy, providing in each case a 
basic conceptual framework, a succinct review of the existing international evidence, and 
some new results with an emphasis in Latin American and Caribbean nations.  
 
The structure of the chapter will be as follows: In Section 1, some introductory 
definitions regarding the elusive concept of financial crisis are provided; the effects on 
the banking system’s balance sheet will be the subject of Section 2, with an emphasis on 
four recent Latin American crises. This analysis will set the ground for subsequent work. 
Section 3 will present evidence on crisis -related fiscal costs and their effectiveness. 
Section 4 will go over the short- and medium-term macroeconomic effects, with Section 
5 devoted to long-term economic growth. Some conclusions and lessons close. 
 
  
Before proceeding it might be helpful to visualize the link between financial crises and 
economic performance: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial crisis and its economic consequences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regardless of the origin of the crisis, once in motion, it gives rise to fiscal costs 
associated to bailout policies and to changes in the overall structure of the commercial 
banking system with direct effect on private expenditure. These public and private 
channels jointly cause the rate of economic growth to vary. 1  
                                                 
1 Of course, financial crises are typically accompanied by a host of other phenomena, such as productive 
adverse shocks, inflation, currency devaluations, cuts in international credit, revision of economic 
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 Section 1: Defining financial crises  
 
Some methodological pitfalls come up at the moment of establishing what a crisis is and 
how long and pervasive its effects are. This is a sensitive matter from a public point of 
view, once such costs are crucial for the design of anti-crisis policies and its benefit-cost 
evaluation.  
 
Defining a financial crisis is a tricky matter. As in any industry, situations of distress in 
which some individual firms have difficulties in meeting regulatory requirements, or are 
even closed, can occur at times without being automatically labelled as a large-scale 
crisis prone to disrupt the normal working of the economy. 2 Therefore, letting aside the 
arbitrariness of any precise definition, for the goal of this chapter, a systemic crisis is an 
event characterized by one or more of the following: massive withdrawals of deposits, 
deposit freezes, fiscal measures of any sort directed at rescuing banking sector 
stakeholders, or where banks’ balance sheets are put under considerable strain. For 
practical purposes, we have employed, unless specified otherwise, the financial crises 
database assembled by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who define a systemic financial 
crisis as a case in which much or all of bank capital is exhausted. 
 
Equally problematic is to estimate the severity and length of the crisis. In principle, after 
identifying the variables of interest, one should compare their actual values during the 
crisis with the pre-crisis trend. In part due to data limitations, previous studies have often 
used a three-year window, and this chapter will stick to that convention for the most part. 
However, crises are usually preceded by abnormal economic conditions –as a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                 
expectations, and so on. This implies that isolating the pure real effects of the financial crisis turns out to be 
a challenging task. 
2 Unless specified, financial crisis will be understood as a banking crisis . Adopting a broader perspective, 
the concept should also comprise problems reaching capital markets and institutional investors. However, 
difficulties here do not propagate to the real sector in the way they do with troubled banks. The main 
difference is that a stock market fall reflects itself into lower security prices without reducing the external 
financing for the private sector –equity contracts have an infinite duration and market debt generally holds 
a longer maturity than bank debt. Besides, lenders demand a fixed rate of return on debt, while they have 
only a residual right in share contracts. Thus, an adverse shock will put the firm on the verge of bankruptcy 
under debt financing but not under share financing. 
fact, no crisis is an exogenous and sudden event, but it is incubated by the very dynamics  
of the economy. In some cases, credit and productive booms develop in the run-up of the 
crisis. In others, a prolonged slowdown can gradually deteriorate the perceived solvency 
and profitability of financial and non-financial firms, becoming the catalyst of the crisis. 
Comparing against a boom (downturn) will overestimate (underestimate) the crisis-
induced fall. An alternative is to widen the window to ten years, as will be done when 
assessing the macroeconomic effects.  
 
Furthermore, it is hard to assert when a crisis is over. Employing the standard procedure 
of tying the dating of the crisis to the activity level evolution might sometimes be 
misleading. As far as the financial crisis can be just one manifestation of other economic 
disequilibria, the return to the previous growth rate or even the same per capita GDP 
observed before the crisis is too strong an ending criterion. For instance, it could the case 
that the financial crisis subsides relatively fast, judging by the normalization of banking 
indicators, but the country does not recover the previous GDP trend for a long time due to 
negative structural break caused by a negative and permanent productive shock 
independent of the financial crisis. Under these circumstances, the macroeconomic 
criterion would be flawed, and a more comprehensive classification procedure 
embodying both macroeconomic and bank-level data would be advisable. Unfortunately, 
bank accounting is not fully reliable around a crisis, forcing analysts to turn to 
macroeconomic figures.   
 
 
Section 2: Banking balance sheet effects from financial crises 
 
Before they propagate to the rest of the economy, financial crises translates into 
perceptible changes in the very balance sheets of banks. This section will describe the 
micro-level dynamics of four Latin American crises: Argentina (2001), Brazil (1999), 
Chile (1998), Colombia (1998) , Mexico (1998), Peru (1998)  and Uruguay (2002). Even 
though the extent of the banking problems differ across these cases, a common feature is 
that they all display some or all of the features usually associated with a financial crisis.3  
 
2.1 A first look at selected bank indicators  
 
International evidence from 32 crisis in 1980-1995 is offered by Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2001), who conclude that accounting indicators of profitability and asset quality get 
worse as a consequence of the crisis, but they return to earlier levels two years later, 
while net worth is not directly affected. Henceforth, bank-level data suggests that crises 
have the mild and temporary effect that they encounter in macroeconomic data, a topic to 
be dealt with in Section 3.  
 
To start, it is worth noticing that only in the Argentine and Uruguayan crises an apparent 
bank run took place, while, in the other episodes, deposits did not appear to deviate much 
from their previous trajectory: 
                                                 
3 In fact, the Argentine crisis is the only one included in the Caprio and Klingebiel’s database. 
 Real deposits (Quarter crisis = 100)
Quarter Argentina Brazil Colombia Peru Chile Mexico Uruguay
(Crisis=0)
-10 114 76 76 73 88 69 78
-9 116 77 75 78 89 68 83
-8 115 80 75 82 90 68 84
-7 119 80 83 86 95 70 86
-6 122 86 79 89 96 97 86
-5 123 90 80 92 94 95 90
-4 120 91 95 94 94 95 94
-3 119 95 106 98 93 99 99
-2 119 96 100 100 93 97 103
-1 110 98 99 102 95 99 111
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
+1 104 99 115 107 99 97 92
+2 83 97 111 111 98 98 98
+3 81 97 111 112 104 99 94
+4 79 94 109 116 101 101 86
+5 81 93 116 116 102 101 83
+6 87 92 115 116 98 109 .
+7 90 95 113 114 99 104 .
+8 . 94 110 113 100 102 .
+9 . 95 122 109 105 95 .
+10 . 96 127 108 102 96 .
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regardless of the intermediation volume, balance sheets have been altered by the crisis. 
To assess the changes around the crisis, the three years before and the four years after 
were examined in the Brazilian, Colombian, Chilean, Mexican, andPeruvian crises, 
which began in the first quarter of 1999 (Brazil) and the third quarter (Colombia, Chile, 
Mexico, and  Peru). For Argentina, given the shorter period available, the three post-
crisis periods are the first semester of 2002, the second semester of 2002, and the first 
quarter of 2003. Finally, for Uruguay, the only post-crisis period available comprises the 
second and third quarter of 2002. In the light of the small number of cases under scrutiny, 
it becomes somewhat daring to draw definite stylized facts, although a few common 
features come out from the aggregate balance sheet of the banking system, as displayed 
in Table [ ] along with other relevant ratios: 
 
(a) Profitability indicators decline in all countries with the exception of Brazil and 
Mexico, but they gradually recover but still staying well below pre-crisis levels; 
(b) Overhead costs diminish; 
(c) In Colombia and Peru, loan and deposit implicit interest rates go down, as does 
the spread. In Argentina and Brazil, they are more unstable and show no clear 
trend; 
(d) Loan loss provisions increase in all countries as a result of the deteriorated quality 
of the loan portfolio; 
(e) The share of dollar-denominated liabilities clearly falls in the Argentine financial 
system after the compulsory pesoification of bank balance sheets, but this is not 
the case of Peru and Brazil;  
(f) The exposure to the public sector from the assets sideincreases in the four 
countries under analysis. Here it must be borne in mind that this can be partly due 
to the contraction of the credit to the private sector and not necessarily to the net 
increase of credit to the government. In order to test this statistical effect, a 
regression was carried out to explain the public sector exposure in terms of the 
fiscal balance and the rate of growth of the credit to the private sector , yielding 
confirmatory results: 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Public debt to total banking  assets 
Explanatory variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
Fiscal balance to GDP (lagged) -3.649** 
Growth rate of credit to the private sector  
(lagged) 
-0.204*** 
Constant 0.261*** 
  
Observations 158 
F (p-value) 18.47 (0.000) 
Method Pooled OLS 
R-squared 0.136 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
  
(g) The ratio of loans to the private sector to total assets is lower in the aftermath of 
the crisis, although the declining trend seem to precede the outburst; and 
(h) With the exception of Brazil, national pr ivate banks lose market share to foreign 
and state-owned banks. 
 
 
 
Balance sheet effects of financial crises
Return on Equity
ROE t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 2.9% -2.5% 3.8% -15.6% -81.3% -50.3% -18.8%
Brazil -7.4% 14.2% -3.9% 21.4% 8.9% 8.7% -0.1% 19.1%
Colombia 12.1% 12.7% 5.6% -22.9% -21.1% -16.8% 7.1% 12.7%
Peru 21.8% 18.1% 10.3% 6.1% 3.0% 3.0% 6.1% 7.4%
Chile 4.2% 5.1% 3.1% 2.3% 2.7% 2.0% 3.2% 3.1%
Mexico -8.9% -3.2% 7.1% -3.6% 13.2% 13.6% 11.1% 11.2%
Uruguay 6.5% -2.9% -21.5% -55.4% -1734.0%
Interest rate spread
Spread t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 10.7% 11.2% 12.5% 14.4% 6.9% 0.9% 6.6%
Brazil 4.3% 5.1% 6.9% 23.5% 10.5% 9.5% 9.1% 18.6%
Colombia 13.3% 13.2% 11.3% 9.6% 8.7% 8.3% 9.0% 9.1%
Peru 13.2% 12.1% 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 8.0% 7.8% 8.4%
Chile 5.0% 5.4% 4.8% 4.4% 4.6% 4.7% 5.2% 5.7%
Mexico -15.0% -5.5% -2.5% -6.8% -6.7% -2.7% -1.4% 1.5%
Uruguay 2.1% 0.1% -8.0% -12.7% -94.1%
Financial Intermediation Margin
Margen t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 4.3% 4.3% 4.6% 3.7% 13.0% 2.0% -0.5%
Brazil 4.4% 4.2% 4.2% 4.6% 5.3% 4.8% 4.8% 5.1%
Colombia 11.1% 11.2% 11.0% 9.9% 9.2% 9.2% 9.6% 9.5%
Peru 7.8% 7.4% 6.7% 5.7% 5.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.5%
Chile 3.4% 3.2% 2.8% 2.8% 3.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4%
Mexico 5.1% 4.4% 5.0% 5.1% 6.1% 5.3% 5.6% 4.6%
Uruguay 3.9% 3.3% 2.0% 0.1% -22.8%
Leverage
Apalanc t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 9.2 10.0 9.2 7.6 7.1 6.7 7.0
Brazil 9.3 10.7 10.9 10.0 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.7
Colombia 7.5 7.1 7.5 8.1 8.7 9.2 9.5 9.9
Peru 11.5 11.6 11.9 11.7 11.1 10.5 10.0 9.9
Chile 6.0 5.7 4.8 5.1 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.3
Mexico 15.1 14.2 11.3 12.3 10.7 9.7 9.4 9.3
Uruguay 6.7 7.2 10.4 14.4 32.0
Foreign-currency liabilities to total liabilities
Pas dólar t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 66.5% 68.7% 70.1% 72.0% 35.9% 33.6% 29.1%
Brazil 11.9% 11.6% 12.8% 13.1% 13.3% 13.7% 14.4% 15.1%
Colombia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Peru 66.2% 68.2% 71.3% 73.8% 74.6% 75.3% 75.0% 73.1%
Chile 21.3% 20.0% 21.3% 22.5% 24.3% 26.5% 28.7% 31.8%
Mexico 8.2% 16.1% 23.7%
Uruguay 84.8% 87.0% 88.3% 89.1% 88.1%
Foreign-currency assets to total assets
Pas dólar t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 67.88% 69.53% 69.19% 71.19% 35.14% 34.55% 31.78%
Brazil 15.8% 16.0% 16.3% 17.2% 18.1% 18.5% 21.0% 21.3%
Colombia
Peru 46.2% 49.3% 53.1% 56.6% 57.4% 61.8% 73.9% 74.3%
Chile 23.3% 22.6% 24.9% 25.2% 26.7% 29.2% 31.2% 32.8%
Mexico 9.2% 13.7% 17.6%
Uruguay 69.7% 72.2% 75.8% 75.1% 75.5%
Source: Own calculations based on the IADB database and national regulatory agencies.
Balance sheet effects of financial crises (cont.)
Loan loss provisions to total loans
Previsiones t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 8.3% 10.4% 10.9% 12.9% 18.9% 29.6% 32.2%
Brazil 2.1% 2.0% 3.9% 3.7% 3.3% 4.1% 6.4% 6.9%
Colombia 2.2% 2.3% 2.2% 2.9% 4.2% 5.4% 6.6%
Peru 4.2% 4.5% 4.9% 6.4% 7.9% 10.1% 12.8% 12.4%
Chile 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 2.4% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7%
Mexico 3.0% 4.4% 6.7% 6.5% 7.3% 6.8% 6.2% 6.0%
Uruguay 4.5% 5.7% 7.1% 7.9% 7.4%
Loans to private sector to assets
Prest/Activo t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 43.8% 40.2% 37.8% 40.5% 26.6% 19.8% 18.2%
Brazil 35.3% 34.5% 31.3% 31.3% 30.8% 31.0% 30.6% 29.3%
Colombia 66.6% 66.2% 66.7% 66.6% 64.8% 58.6% 55.2% 52.7%
Peru 58.8% 60.5% 61.3% 63.7% 59.3% 57.9% 59.4% 59.0%
Chile 52.2% 49.8% 47.2% 50.2% 46.4% 41.9% 38.6% 36.3%
Mexico 67.2% 69.5% 73.6% 68.8% 67.2% 66.1% 63.8% 56.8%
Uruguay 52.3% 52.2% 49.1% 49.0% 55.2%
Public debt to assets
Prest/Activo t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 21.5% 24.8% 26.0% 30.1% 53.1% 57.0% 55.9%
Brazil 23.7% 27.1% 23.2% 23.7% 27.3% 27.2% 27.4% 27.8%
Colombia 8.9% 10.6% 12.5% 12.9% 13.6% 15.1% 20.0% 23.8%
Peru 3.4% 5.2% 4.9% 6.4% 7.1% 8.1% 9.6% 10.3%
Chile 0.8% 1.5% 1.6% 1.0% 1.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6%
Mexico 28.1% 40.3% 47.0% 46.2% 47.9% 51.4% 51.0% 47.6%
Uruguay 7.0% 5.3% 5.0% 6.0% 8.5%
Deposits in public banks
Dep pub t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 34.2% 33.3% 32.8% 32.4% 35.6% 42.4% 44.3%
Brazil 60.6% 57.9% 53.6% 52.3% 52.3% 51.7% 46.6% 46.1%
Colombia 16.1% 13.7% 15.1% 15.5% 17.0% 18.7% 18.7% 18.2%
Peru 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Chile 15.8% 15.0% 14.7% 13.4% 13.4% 14.1% 12.7% 12.9%
Mexico
Uruguay 41.5% 38.9% 36.4% 38.3% 44.1%
Deposits in foreign banks
dep extranj t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 44.3% 47.4% 48.9% 50.4% 49.6% 42.1% 40.4%
Brazil 8.1% 12.1% 15.0% 15.7% 16.2% 17.1% 20.4% 20.2%
Colombia 10.9% 12.1% 15.2% 18.0% 19.1% 19.0% 19.3% 17.1%
Peru 26.5% 28.4% 29.4% 32.7% 36.9% 52.5% 54.3% 53.3%
Chile 20.6% 28.5% 32.2% 34.8% 39.1% 43.7% 44.3% 45.6%
Mexico
Uruguay 58.5% 61.1% 63.6% 61.7% 55.9%
Source: Own calculations based on the IADB database and national regulatory agencies.
2.2 Financial crisis and financial fragility 
 
 
The fragility of the financial system in Latin America is a recurrent issue. By definition, 
banking systems collapse because their banks are inherently fragile. What has been much 
less looked at is how financial fragility evolves over time as the crisis builds up and 
unravels, what explains financial fragility in the post-crisis period, and whether it 
influences the pace of growth of bank activity. The prior is that a timely, orderly and 
efficient crisis resolution process should reduce financial fragility, paving the way for a 
restoration of the normal flow of deposits and credit. However, this does not appear to be 
always the case, as inferred from some recent Latin American experiences.  
 
2.2.1 The Z-index 
 
This section starts by discussing the properties of the so-called Z-index as a widely 
accepted measure of financial fragility (see De Nicoló et al. (2003a,b)). The Z-index is 
akin to the inverse probability of insolvency and equals (ROA + W)/S, where ROA is the 
return to assets, W is the capital-assets ratio, and S is the standard deviation of ROA. 
Here risk can take the form of lower efficiency (lower ROA), higher leverage (lower W), 
and higher volatility (higher S). In a related interpretation, Levy Yeyati and Micco (2003) 
argue that the square of the Z-index equals the probability that a negative return on assets 
wipes out completely the net worth to assets, thus triggering  bank’s default.  
 
The Z-index shown below was constructed from aggregate figures of each national 
banking system. Inspecting the four Latin American cases listed earlier, and recalling that 
a high Z value reflects low financial fragility, it comes out that financial fragility rose 
after the crisis in Argentina , , Colombia and Uruguay; diminished in Mexico and Chile, 
and meandered around earlier values in Brazil and Peru. Therefore, no single conclusion 
can be drawn. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that when  financial fragility worsens , this 
deterioration tends to occur both before and after the crisis, and does not display any sign 
of reversion even after several years of the outbreak. 
 
 Z-index
t-3 t-2 t-1 t=0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Argentina 46.5 16.2 38.9 8.8 0.5 1.5 2.1 .
Brazil . 7.1 7.8 9.3 11.1 11.6 4.5 11.0
Colombia . 27.4 29.1 2.9 2.4 3.9 8.0 18.5
Peru . 51.2 33.6 35.9 36.2 73.1 46.1 31.7
Chile . 57.3 108.9 102.9 184.4 127.6 156.9 185.1
Mexico . 6.5 16.4 14.5 9.6 22.8 29.7 17.4
Uruguay 19.6 13.7 4.7 1.1 -2.1 . . .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 What is behind the Z-index? 
 
As explained, the Z-index is a simple but powerful measure of the inverse of the 
probability of bank insolvency, that is, the lower Z, the higher the probability of bank 
default. In this sense, it could be used as an early warning test of financial crisis and as a 
monitoring tool in their aftermath.  4 Using  quarterly information for 1996-2002 (and the 
first quarter of 2003 for Argentina), it is shown here which bank and macroeconomic 
variables tend to affect such probability.  
                                                 
4 The shortcoming of the subsequent  analysis  -besides the fact that it is not based on fully specified model 
but on simple correlations- is that it measures financial fragility on an ex-post basis –once it is realized- 
rather than on an ex-ante basis –before it is realized. Clearly, regulators and analysts should concentrate on 
the latter so as to prevent and anticipate difficulties and run stress tests to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
banking system to changes in key systemic variables..  
 Since balance sheet variables are usually highly correlated to each other, a multivariate 
regression is unlikely to shed light on the determinants of the Z-index owing to the 
presence of multicollinearity. Consequently, simple pairwise correlations are instead 
presented  in the next table: 
 
 
 
 
Pairwise correlation of Z-index with selected bank indicators 
Data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia , Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, 1996-2002 
 
Variable Correlation with Z-index   
Lagged Z 0.782*** 
Interest rate spread -0.301** 
Deposit interest rate -0.315*** 
Government assets to total assets -0.374*** 
Overhead expenses to total -0.638*** 
Deposit share of foreign banks 0.164** 
Deposit share of public banks -0.38*** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
The correlation coefficients  –that can range between –1 and 1- are all statistically 
significant, lending some support to the following remarks:  
(i) The Z-index has a high autocorrelation, indicating that it takes time to remove 
financial fragility;  
(ii) Both the interest rate spread and the deposit interest rate increase financial fragility by 
encouraging bank’s risk-taking. It is worth noting that, while a higher spread should 
boost bank returns and possible its capital, it has a greater effect on volatility. These 
observations reinforce the need to maintain a stable financial context –conducive to low 
interest rates- and a strict regulatory framework –to inhibit moral hazard on the part of 
financial intermediaries-;  
 (iii) Financial fragility increases with the proportion of government debt in hands of 
banks. Bank exposure to public assets is undoubtedly one of the more debatable banking 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with previous contributions in the banking literature. See for instance La Porta et al. 
(2002) and Berger et al. (2003). 
issues in the region. For one, exceeding some reasonable level, lending to the government 
goes against the very nature of the bank firm, which specializes in alleviating 
informational barriers that preclude private firms and consumers from getting credit –
lending to the government often implies null screening and monitoring skills except for a 
good overview of the macroeconomic context. Given its seemingly superior repayment 
capacity and the willingness to pay higher returns, public assets tend to crowd out loans 
to the private sector. This attractive risk-return combination encourages bank moral 
hazard, which may end up being poorly supervised and punished by the regulator due to 
its own conflict of interest –under limited political independency of the regulator, the 
treasure will induce the regulator to overlook the riskiness of public assets in order to 
keep a fluid access to bank financing. This perverse incentive mechanisms suggests that, 
at least in Latin America, public bonds and loans are certainly not risk-free assets as in 
industrial countries and hence deserve a more symmetric regulatory treatment vis-à-vis 
private portfolios;   
(iv) As expected, financial fragility is positively correlated to administrative costs. 
Besides its direct incidence on lower returns, it must be borne in mind that cost-
inefficiency puts an upward pressure on interest rate spreads;  
 (v) The share of deposits in hands of foreign and public banks have countervailing 
effects on fragility, with the former reducing fragility and the second amplifying it.7 
Decomposing the Z-index for foreign and public banks, it was found that foreign banks 
present better individual indicators: 
 
 
 
 
     
Variable Foreign banks Public banks 
 
ROA -0.3% -3.6% 
Capital to Assets 13.6% 9.1% 
Standard deviation of ROA 1.4% 5.7% 
 
  
 
(vi) In light of the acute impact of currency mismatches in some recent crisis, it is worth 
discussing the statistical relationship of the proportion of liabilities and assets in foreign 
currency with the Z-index. 10 On the plus side, under credible and stable exchange rates 
regimes, foreign currency exposures contribute to reduce loan and deposit interest rates 
and to stretch the maturity of bank liabilities. But on the minus side, currency mismatches 
are a catalyst of solvency problems in the banking and the nonfinancial sector if an 
exchange rate crisis takes place. Since the negative effect is more prone to arise in highly 
dollarized economies, the correlation between dollar-denominated assets, liabilities, and 
the Z-index was separately run for Argentina, Peru and Uruguay, and for Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, with this outcome: 
 
Variable Argentina, Peru  
and Uruguay 
Brazil, Chile,  
Colombia and Mexico 
Dollar-denominated 
liabilities to total liabilities 
0.726 0.634 
Dollar-denominated assets 
to total assets 
0.186 0.216 
Correlation of dollarized 
liabilities and Z-index 
0.03 -0.014 
Correlation of dollarized 
assets and Z-index 
0.76*** 0.783*** 
 
* Correlations significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
                                                 
10 Note that currency mismatches are in general small, but bank solvency does not depend entirely on the 
currency denomination of its loans but on the currency mismatch of the ultimate borrowers (firms, families 
and the government).   
According to the table, mild dollarization is positively correlated with lower fragility, but 
high dollarization has no clear effect.  
  
(vii) High bank liquidity is closely associated to lower financial fragility, implying that 
the profit-reducing effect is outweighed by the stability-enhancing effect. Logically, 
keeping money out of the loan market defies the very social function of financial 
intermediaries. However, liquidity hoarding could be a helpful bank policy in the 
transition towards a more solid system;  
 
 
 
The degree of financial fragility depends not only on the risk-taking behavior of banks 
but also on macroeconomic conditions –actually, in Latin America, it is likely that 
macroeconomic forces have had more weight on bank performance than bank-level 
policies in some periods of time. Dipping into the macroeconomic roots of the Z-index, a 
regression was performed with the following results: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Z-index 
Explanatory variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
GDP growth rate (lagged) 135.55* 
Inflation rate (lagged) -192.47*** 
Variance of the nominal exchange rate -14.76*** 
Real exchange rate -0.014** 
Deposits to GDP 65.78*** 
Constant 15.78*** 
  
Observations 129 
F (p-value) 10.92 (0.000) 
Method Pooled OLS 
R-squared 0.183 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Focusing on the coefficients that are statistically significant, the estimation shows that 
financial fragility goes up with:  
(i) The inflation rate and the nominal exchange rate volatility, which have deleterious 
effects on the stability of relative prices and thus on some borrowers’ repayment 
capacity;  
(ii) The real exchange rate, whose effect runs primarily through balance sheet effects on 
currency-mismatched borrowers, including the very banks and the state; and  
(iii) Financial deepening, as proxied by the ratio of deposits to GDP, reduces financial 
fragility, as it is  usually associated with lower transaction costs, lower interest rates and a 
more stable macroeconomic context.11,12  
 
2.2.3 Financial fragility and credit to the private sector 
 
One interesting question at this point has to do with the determinants of the variation of 
the credit to the private sector in Latin American crisis countries. This question might 
become even more relevant once credit shocks are to be transmitted to the real sector, as 
discussed later on. The following table shows the result of a regression analysis 
explaining the growth rate of credit to the private sector: 
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real credit to the private sector 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) 
                                                 
11 To deal with the potential reverse causality of the Z-index to deposits, this variable was instrumented 
with the deposit interest rate and the fiscal surplus.  It must be mentioned that this stability-enhancing effect 
has been at times challenged by some scholars that highlight the risks posed by rapid financial deepening in 
poorly supervised banking systems (see for instance Krugman (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhardt 
(1999)). 
12 When using country fixed effects, deposits to GDP and GDP growth remain significant, but the 
remaining variables lose explanatory power. 
 
Lagged Z-index 0.263** 0.289*** 
Deposit growth rate  0.571*** 
Fixed investment growth 
rate (lagged) 
0.105** 0.054* 
Fiscal balance to GDP -0.131 -0.071 
Interest rate on loans -0.005 -0.057* 
Constant -0.006 -0.01 
No. Observations 129 129 
Method Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
F-test (p-value) 2.76 (0.006) 11.80 (0.000) 
 R-squared 0.155 0.51 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
T-statistics computed using robust standard errors. 
Crisis variables are dummies with value 1 for the four quarters post-crisis, 0 otherwise. 
Regressions include country dummies. 
 
According to the first column, financial fragility limits credit growth. This could be either 
a consequence of depositors exerting market discipline and thus rationing funds to a 
distressed financial system or a conservative response on the part of banks to a delicate 
situation in which new loan extensions can widen maturity mismatches and overall risk. 
To deal with this issue, the deposit growth rate appears in Column (2), displaying a 
positive and significant sign without altering much the estimated coefficient on the Z-
index. This means that, after controlling for the behavior of depositors, the level of 
financial fragility slows down the credit growth rate by way of the own decision of the 
banking sector of curtailing loan growth rather than to the financing constraint imposed 
by the depositors. Besides, the almost unchanged coefficient on the Z-index after 
including deposit growth unveils some lack of market discipline by depositors, clashing 
against some pieces of evidence to this hypothesis. 13 
 
The investment growth rate –instrumented by its first lag- is a proxy for the demand for 
credit. The positive coefficient indicates that credit demand factors are also relevant –this 
will be picked up later when considering the existence of a credit crunch on economic 
activity. The fiscal surplus, which is intended to capture crowding-out effects on the 
                                                 
13 See Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) for an international sample of countries, Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (1998) for Latin American countries, and Arena (2003) for Latin American and Asian countries.  
private sector, is not significant, as it is the loan interest rate in the first column –in the 
second one, it is significant at a 10% level with the negative expected sign.  
 
3. Fiscal costs of financial crises 
 
Systemic financial crises are especially damaging once they not only provoke the 
liquidation of many financial institutions but they spill over credit-dependent firms and 
families that will likely be pushed towards financial distress or even bankruptcy. Another 
widely mentioned argument in favor of crisis containment is that crisis can take a toll on 
the normal functioning of the payments system, depriving firms from the required level 
of liquidity to conduct their businesses and afford their working capital. This concern 
departs from the modern focus of the finance literature on the assets side of the banks and 
the impact of credit constraints on firms’ and consumers’ activity. The liquidity view 
stresses the impediments to make payments through the banking system credited to the 
payer’s cash deposits (without the need of additional bank loans), forcing firms to rely on 
cash transactions or even to undo certain operations. As a matter of fact, since credit and 
payments problems are to a great extent two sides of the same coin, it is difficult to 
separate the effects of financial crises that operate through the assets side of the balance 
sheet from those working through the liabilities side.14  
 
This widespread effect provides the rationale for some degree of government intervention 
to bailout banks and depositors and thus mitigate the economy-wide consequences.  
This section will describe the possible policy tools, the quantification of the associated 
costs, why these costs vary across different episodes, and whether the intervention 
facilitates a softer landing vis -à-vis the no intervention scenario or instead creates new 
problems of their own. 
                                                 
14 There is no much hard evidence to rely on about the consequences of liquidity shortages, though. 
Commander et al. (2000) study the growth of barter in Russia –where liquidity problems were in motion 
even before the August 1998 crisis - exploiting a questionnaire among Russian firms carried out in late 
1998,  but they find no significant effect of the share of non-monetary on total transactions –a proxy for 
liquidity problems - on sales growth. 
 
 
 
 Governments have at their disposal several crisis resolution tools, including the liquidity 
support to and the recapitalization of insolvent institutions, insurance schemes for 
depositors and other bank creditors, deposit freezes, regulatory and supervisory 
forbearance for financial institutions, setup of asset management companies to absorb and 
recover nonperfoming loans, and debt relief programs for distressed borrowers.  
 
Not all of these instruments cause a direct, pecuniary budgetary cost –for instance, 
forbearance and deposit freezes do not imply any monetary transfer by themselves. But it 
is apparent that there are fiscal and quasi-fiscal expenditures involved in rehabilitating the 
financial system. 15  Figure [  ] shows the fiscal costs of banking crises in 40 episodes in 
the 1980s and 1990s, using data from Honohan and Klingebiel (2000)):    
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15 Quasi-fiscal costs are those not fully reflected in the Treasury budget, because they are directly financed 
by the Central Bank.  
Fiscal costs are sizable, and Latin America stands out among other country groups: on 
average, these costs amounted to 20.6% of GDP, against 11.2% and 8.2% in other 
developing countries and in industrial countries, respectively. Of course, the most 
relevant test to judge the benefits of the government intervention lies in how it helped the 
country to cope with the duration and depth of the crisis. Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) 
demonstrate that neither the output loss nor the recovery time are influenced by the host 
of policy tools mentioned above, and even one of them (the liquidity support to banks by 
the monetary authority) heightens the output loss and retards the recovery. 16  
 
The following graph displays , for 38 crisis, the relationship between fiscal costs and GDP 
growth performance (measured by the change in the annual GDP growth rate between the 
three years after and before the crisis) , where it is apparent that they are negatively 
correlated –the correlation coefficient is –0.51 and it is statistically significant at 1%:  
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This correlation poses a serious doubt about the effectiveness of fiscal interventions to 
smooth the crisis effects, since, according to the graph, the more governments spend to 
control the crisis, the deeper is the productive slump.  However, the causality can go 
                                                 
16 Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997) reach the same conclusion regarding liquidity support after looking at 
either way, as fiscal costs depend on the intensity of the crisis and the latter can be 
influenced by the crisis policies put in motion.  A simultaneous estimation of both 
equations is the proper tool to deal with this problem. A number of two- and three-stage 
least squares regressions were run, but results (not reported here) were highly unstable  
and sensitive to the set of additional control variables. Nevertheless, in none of such 
regressions it was found that fiscal costs were able to improve the growth performance.17  
 
Anyway, one should be cautious at the time of giving a categorical verdict on the link 
between fiscal costs and the real effects of a crisis. First of all, saying that the government 
measures are unable to diminish the social costs of the crisis is not the same as proving 
that such social costs would have been lower without any public action whatsoever. 
Markets do not work properly whenever uncertainty, panic, and pessimism takes over the 
private sector decision-making process, and so the fact that the government is willing to 
intervene might encourage more optimistic expectations and ameliorate the typical 
coordination problems among pr ivate agents. This would require counterfactual evidence 
showing that crisis countries with totally passive governments perform better, everything 
else equal, than those with active anti-crisis policies., but it is  difficult to find cases in 
which the government was fully prescident. 21 A related historical episode is the Great 
Depression in the U.S. beginning in the late 1920s, where the Federal Reserve was 
blamed of the crisis depth because it refused to inject enough liquidity to the system, but 
even this case remains controversial. In any event, from Honohan and Klingebiel’s 
database, it is observed that the only countries not pursuing massive rescue packages 
(over a total of 40 cases) were Argentina 1995, Phillipines 1998-present, and Turkey 
                                                                                                                                                 
the speed and success of bank restructuring packages in crisis countries.  
17 Additionally, the regressions show that fiscal costs are also a function of the country’s development 
status: governments in developing countries spend more than others. Similar results emerge when replacing 
developing for Latin American countries. This likely reflect inefficiency and corruption factors. In fact, 
when an index of rule of law (see Kaufman et al. (2003)) is included instead of the developing country 
variable, the positive and statistically significant sign still holds. 
21 As someone put it  in reference to deposit insurance, there are two types of countries: those that have 
deposit insurance and know it, and those that have deposit insurance and do not know it yet. 
1982-1985, where the fiscal costs amounted to 0.5%, 0.5% and 2.5% of GDP, 
respectively. However, the corresponding GDP dips were 11.9, 7.5, and 0 percentage 
points. These values are below the average for the whole sample, which reinforces the 
idea that fiscal intervention is endogenous : governments always intervene when crises are 
profound and prone to get out of handunder a totally private sector-led crisis resolution.. 
Based on this observation, the hypothesis that public policies are effective in containing 
large-scale crisis should not be rejected without further investigation.  
 
Letting aside the issue raised in the previous paragraph,  the evidence at hand does not 
seem favorable to public interventions in the face of a financial crisis. Even in the case 
that these policies turn out to smooth the downturn in the short run, it is debatable 
whether the long-lasting effects are positive as: (a) Money issuance might boost inflation; 
(b) Government intervention does not completely eliminate the social costs from a crisis 
but mainly redistribute such costs across social groups and over time. Intersectoral 
transfers induced by public policies may alter income distribution, potentially causing 
social unrest and conflicts between winners and losers; (c) Domestic and external debt 
issuance may increase the future tax burden on the private sector, distorting consumption 
and investment decisions; and (d) Public bailouts may exacerbate bank’s and borrowers’ 
moral hazard in the future, once agents anticipate that they will not bear the cost of their 
opportunistic actions. Thus, by inducing excessive risk-taking, bailouts can be the 
catalyst of a new financial crisis.22 These forces can most likely hamper long-term growth 
prospects.  
 
 
4. Financial crisis and short-run economic growth 
 
After having noticing that credit can be seriously affected in the wake of a financial 
crisis, the question that arises immediately relates to the actual impact of credit on 
                                                 
22 This is a recurrent, yet unresolved issue, at the national and international level. One application of it is 
the study of the consequences of a deposit insurance system which, although it encourages public 
confidence in the financial sector, it relaxes market discipline, thus threatening systemic stability. 
aggregate demand and economic growth.  This section will tackle this question by going 
over the theory and the international evidence and by taking a closer look to four recent 
crises in Latin America. 
 
4.1 Theoretical links between financial crises and private expenditure  
 
The standard, frictionless optimization model of a representative individual contends that 
people save in order to smooth consumption over time and across possible events, and 
firms invest until the marginal productivity of capital equals the cost of capital. Under 
this paradigm of perfect financial markets, financial crises would not be in fact crises 
because consumption and investment decisions would not be changed. A model like this, 
in which individual have access to unbounded credit to fill any desired temporary gap 
between income and expenditure, allows to reach the maximum possible level of well-
being. However, it is a well-established fact that financial markets suffer at least three 
imperfections: intermediation costs, informational problems, and taxes. To start, external 
sources of funds (debt and shares) are more expensive than internal sources due to the 
costs involved in the financial intermediation business.23 Furthermore, lenders have less 
information than borrowers concerning the ability and willingness to pay. To 
counterbalance this informational asymmetry, lenders cover themselves by requiring 
higher rates of return or directly denying financing to some people (see Bebczuk (2003) 
for a textbook presentation). For the same reasons, it is difficult to purchase insurance 
against any negative shock, turning uncertainty a crucial variable to determine how much 
to spend and save. When these real-world features are internalized, it is easy to draw a 
connection between financial crisis and saving and investment decisions, which can be 
classified into four channels: 
 
(a) Availability of credit and transaction balances 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) empirically claim that the second, negative effect prevails and 
show that the presence of deposit insurance raises the probability of a financial crisis. 
Financial crises are frequently accompanied by a lower volume of credit. This is mostly 
explained by information-related issues as, due to the reigning uncertainty and the bleak 
economic prospects, it becomes harder to distinguish good from bad projects (adverse 
selection) and it is more tempting to take riskier projects or even to refuse debt repayment 
(moral hazard). Lacking reliable information on the ability of each bank to pay back and 
knowing that only the first in line will get the money, depositors prefer to run against all 
banks. This forces banks to cut credit, but in an uneven fashion across borrowers. 
Younger and smaller firms tend to be the major victims, owing to their opacity and lack 
of reputation and diversification.24,25 Besides, banks are more willing to lend to 
companies that post some collateral and partially use internal funds, since these are 
signals of expected good behavior. With the rise of interest rates and the declining sales 
that come with financial crises, the ability of firms to convey such signals is markedly 
restricted, bringing about less credit at higher costs and shorter maturities. In sum, credit-
dependent firms and families can likely see their expenditure reduced in what it is known 
as a financial constraint;26  
 
The lack of liquidity that can follow a financial crisis is another disruptive effect on the 
level of activity. As highlighted in the Introduction to Section 3, the malfunctioning of 
the payments system can be a serious obstacle for daily transactions. Although most of 
the literature is concentrated in the credit channel rather than the payments channel, the 
latter should not be overlooked. 27  
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Of course, these costs are outweighed by the benefits delivered by the financial system in terms of 
evaluation and control of borrowers, risk diversification activities, and economies of scale vis -à-vis the case 
of individual management of savings. 
24 See Mishkin (1997) on the asymmetric information approach to financial crises, and Kuttner and Mosser 
(2002) on the role of these factors in the transmission of monetary policies. 
25 Only small firms with lasting lending relationships with a few banks will be able to avoid the loan cut. 
Such lending relationship provide creditors with valuable financial and, even more importantly, personal 
information on the borrower, based on which they may decide to keep granting credit to thes e selected 
firms (see Petersen and Rajan (1994) for evidence for the U.S. and Bebczuk (2002) for Argentina). By the 
way,  the closing of banks is particularly harmful for borrowers with extended lending relationship, once 
they cause the destruction of so-called informational capital.  
26 On evidence regarding financial constraints for firms, see Kadapakkam et al. (1998) for developed 
countries and Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003) for Latin America. As for consumption, see Campbell and 
Mankiw (1989) for the U.S. and Arreaza (2000) for Latin America.    
27 Of course, the importance of the payments system as a trasnmission channel of financial crisis to the rest 
of the economy depends on how intensive its use is by firms and families. In countries with scarce use of 
 (b) Uncertainty  
 
In the volatile environment that characterize financial crises, risk aversion will induce 
firms to pass up or postpone some investment projects, especially when they involve 
irreversible costs (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the theoretical rationale and Serven 
(2002) for cross-country evidence). Likewise, under certain conditions, families will 
exhibit a precautionary saving behavior, by which they will cut present consumption in 
order to build a buffer stock to avoid a pronounced fall in future consumption under a bad 
event (see Deaton (1992) for the theoretical background, and Loayza et al. (2001) for 
cross-country empirical support).   
 
(c) Income shocks 
 
If the crisis happens along with an economic downturn, agents will revise their 
expenditure plans. Before a temporary income fall, consumers will reduce their saving 
rate to smooth consumption over time. Forward-looking firms should not modify much 
their investment activity, as it is presumed that the installation of new capital today aims 
to satisfy demand in the future, when the shock is over. But a host of studies have shown 
that firms exhibit excess sensitivity to current economic conditions due to either 
uncertainty, myopia or financial constraints (see Bebczuk (1999) for evidence related to 
Latin American countries). When the adverse shock is perceived as permanent, 
investment and consumption will decrease more than under temporary shocks.  
 
(d) Interest rates 
 
Interest rates tend to rise around financial crises, influencing private sector decisions 
through: (i) The increase in the cost of capital (be it internal or external funds) diminishes 
investment activity; (ii) As mentioned earlier, higher interest rates reduce the availability 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial services and where the underground economy is broadly spread, most transaction will be 
conducted in cash and the real  economy and the banking system will be only weakly connected. 
and value of collateral;  and (iii) Saving decisions may change, although the interaction 
of the substitution, income, and wealth effects makes it hard to predict what the final 
effect will be (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a thorough theoretical presentation and 
some evidence on the low saving sensitivity to interest rates). 
 
While the previous decomposition obeys to the need of having a clear understanding of 
the various effects at play, it does not mean that one can replicate it at the empirical level, 
as changes take place simultaneously and are closely interrelated. A profuse literature has 
investigated the link between abrupt reductions in the flow of credit and the level of 
activity, with especial reference to crisis episodes. This credit crunch strand of 
macrofinancial research has been lately applied to the Asian meltdown of 1997. Among 
others, Borensztein and Lee (2000) provide evidence of a credit crunch in Korea, as Ito 
and Pereira da Silva (1999) do for Thailand and Indonesia, and Chen and Wang (2003) 
for Taiwan. 
 
Even though it is very popular among analysts to establish a direct relationship from 
credit to economic activity, the casual link is far from being straightforward and rests on 
two conditions: (a) Financial markets are not perfect à la Modigliani-Miller in that firms 
and families are unable to substitute the lost credit with other sources of funding without 
altering their expenditure plans; and (b) There is excess credit demand making the credit 
constraint binding. For instance, if actual and expected aggregate demand are weak, there 
will not be much demand for credit. Likewise, firms may have idle capacity and workers 
that can be used to increase supply with a minimum need of new funding.  
 
4.2 Describing the macroeconomic effects of financial crises 
 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2001) use a simple econometric procedure to estimate the effects 
of the crisis in 32 episodes during 1980-1995, by comparing the performance in the crisis 
year and the three next years with the performance in the previous three-year period. 
They document that, on average: (1) Just two years after the crisis, the GDP growth rate 
is back to the previous rate; (2) Credit growth is about 7 percentage points below the pre-
crisis trend even three years after the crisis, defying the presumption that the credit 
contraction constraints economic growth –this topic will be examined later on; (3)  
Compared to the three-year pre-crisis period, the inflation and depreciation rates are still 
20 percentage points higher in the three years after the crisis; and (4) Fiscal variables and 
interest rates do not appear to change significantly after the cris is outbreak. In all, these 
results portrait a rather benign panorama arising from crises. Anyway, as argued in 
Section 1, this conclusion is conditioned to the window chosen and the variables 
examined, besides the fact that data come from a set of countrie s that included both 
developed and developing countries.   
 
In what follows, crisis effects on selected relevant indicators are revisited focusing on 
Latin American events in the 1980s and 1990s. To take account of the sensitivity to 
different window estimations, and depending upon data availability, different possibilities 
are explored and compared, namely: the year of the crisis and the three following years 
against the average of the (i) three years, (ii) five years, and (iii) ten years before the 
crisis; the year of the crisis and the five following years against the average of the five 
years before the crisis; and the year of the crisis and the ten following years against the 
average of the ten years before the crisis.  
 
Starting from a graphical approximation, the median values of selected macroeconomic 
variables are shown next. Among the non-financial variables, it is observed that the GDP 
growth is noticeably lower in the aftermath of the crisis, but the growth gap vis-à-vis the 
pre-crisis scenario tends to shrink as a longer period is under consideration. The fiscal 
deficit also increases, especially under the 3- and 5-year post-crisis windows. The 
inflation and investment rates do not seem to change in a clear way. Concerning the 
financial variables, the rates of growth of both deposits and credit to the private sector fall 
at all windows, but remain positive, while the ratios of credit and deposit grow over their 
pre-crisis medians owing to the fact that they continue to grow faster than GDP. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real GDP growth rate
in Latin American financial crises
3.0 3.0 3.0
1.3
1.8 1.8
2.3
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
Annual inflation rate
in Latin American financial crises
27.0
22.4
18.0
15.8
20.2 20.2 20.6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
Gross investment to GDP
in Latin American financial crises
19.5
18.7
19.1
20.7
18.2
19.3 19.3
17
17
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
Fiscal surplus
in Latin American financial crises
-1.8
-1.6
-2.2
-2.4
-2.9
-2.0
-2.1
-4
-3
-3
-2
-2
-1
-1
0
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ia
n 
va
lu
es
 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual growth rate of 
credit to the private sector
in Latin American financial crises
9.1
13.2
14.4
11.6
7.1
6.4
4.7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
Annual growth rate of deposits
in Latin American financial crises
7.9
9.7
10.7
8.0
4.9
4.2 4.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Credit to GDP
in Latin American financial crises
14.7
16.1
17.3
19.9 19.7
21.6 22.4
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
Deposits to GDP
in Latin American financial crises
14.5
16.9
18.5
21.1
19.8
21.4 21.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
-10 -5 -3 0 3 5 10
Window
M
ed
ian
 va
lue
s 
in 
pe
rce
nta
ge
For the sake of obtaining a more representative summary measure, the following 
procedure is adopted: the average value of each variable in the post-crisis period is 
regressed against the average value of the same variable in the pre-crisis period, the 
estimated coefficient reflecting the degree of persistence. For example, a coefficient of 
1.09 means that in the post-crisis period the variable of interest is 9% above its pre-crisis 
level.28 Coefficients are said to be statistically significant if they differ from 0 (no 
relationship at all between the pre- and the post-crisis period) and 1 (no change between 
periods). 
 
The real GDP growth rate appears to be quite affected by the crisis. Under the 3-year/3-
year (post- to pre-crisis), it is barely 18.8% of the pre-crisis growth rate –if the pre-crisis 
rate was 5%, after the crisis it amounts to 0.94%. However, the drop is partially reverted 
as longer horizons are considered: for instance, with the 3-year/10-year window, it goes 
down to 33.9% and, with the 10-year/10-year window, to 38%.  Despite the decreasing 
crisis-sensitivity of the economy, the fact that the growth rate in the decade after the crisis 
stays still below to that in the decade before the crisis suggests that financial crises cause 
not only a cyclical downturn but also a persistent growth deceleration. The real per capita 
GDP does not appear to be hurt, as it remains at pre-crisis levels in the short-run and 
increases mildly in the longer-run –although the lower growth rate negatively affects its 
trend. 29 The investment rate falls 6.4% in the initial 3-year post-crisis period, returning to 
preceding levels as time goes by. Private consumption, in turn, increases permanently by 
3% to 5% according to the time frame chosen. The inflation rises in the three-year period 
following the crisis, exceeding for 55.7% the pre-crisis rate, but it later diminishes to 
levels well below, even though the fiscal balance deteriorates, most likely owing to the 
fiscal costs of the crisis and the growth rate slowdown. 30 Finally, a post-crisis real 
                                                 
28 It is noteworthy that this is not a test of causality but only a stylized description of the data, meaning that 
the changes in a particular variable cannot be entirely attributed to the crisis. Such casuality analysis 
requires the inclusion of other influencing variables, as done in other parts of this chapter.  
29 The striking result that per capita GDP is rather stable in spite of the slower rate of growth can be 
rationalized by recalling that the median annual GDP growth rate in the 3- and 10-year after crisis period 
was 1.8 and 2.3%, respectively. As far as population growth rates are below those levels, the per capita 
GDP can still grow. 
30 The finding that the fiscal position worsens at the same time that the inflation rate falls may seem at odds 
with conventional explanations of the latter. In spite of the close relationship between fiscal policy and 
inflation, it should be kept in mind that other variables are also central to the determination of the inflation 
exchange rate appreciation is observed, which is consistent with stabilization plans under 
fixed or quasi-fixed nominal exchange rates and inflationary inertia. 
 
As for the financial variables, the real growth rates of credit and deposits stay below 
those observed before the crisis regardless of the period under inspection, but the effect is 
higher in the short-run. Nevertheless, as a result of the steeper reduction of GDP, the ratio 
of deposit and credit to the private sector to GDP strikingly grows over the pre-crisis 
level, even under the 3-year/3-year window. Finally, Central Bank assets are also lower, 
which implies that government bailout is not primarily based on direct liquidity support 
to commercial banks. 
 
Macroeconomic effects of financial crises in Latin America 
Variable Average of year crisis and
3 post-crisis years 3 post-crisis years 3 post-crisis years 5 post-crisis years 10 post-crisis years 
Against average of 
3 pre-crisis years 5 pre-crisis years 10 pre-crisis years 5 pre-crisis years 10 pre-crisis years 
Macroeconomic variables:
GDP growth rate 0.188 0.235 0.339 0.254 0.38
Inflation 1.557 0.855 0.523 (ns) 0.572 0.196 (ns)
Real exchange rate 0.765 0.713 0.538 0.871 0.513
Real per capita GDP 0.999 1.025 1.086 1.048 1.171
Private consumption to GDP 1.034 1.037 1.032 1.045 1.05
Gross investment to GDP 0.934 0.971 0.996 0.979 0.996
Fiscal balance to GDP 0.626 0.558 0.716 0.411 0.447
Banking variables:
Real growth of credit to the private sector 0.163 0.31 0.381 0.249 0.23 (ns)
Private credit to GDP 1.118 1.187 1.326 1.173 1.24
Real growth of deposits 0.303 0.469 0.574 0.374 0.337
Deposits to GDP 1.224 1.327 1.346 1.374 1.423
Central Bank assets to total assets 0.734 0.721 0.676 0.704 0.629
(ns) Statistically not significantly different from 0 and 1.
Methodology explained in the text.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rate, such as the exchange rate policy, the source of financing of the fiscal deficit, the unemployment rate, 
4.3 Financial crises, credit and economic growth in the short -run 
 
To address the issue of whether credit availability matters for the level of economic 
activity, a regression analysis will be performed based on quarterly information from the 
same Latin American countries of Section 2.  The dependent variables is the quarterly 
rate of growth of GDP: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and so on. 
Dependent variable: GDP growth rate 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
One-quarter lag of 
change in credit to 
the private sector to 
GDP  
0.161*** 0.12*** 0.143*** 
Two-quarter lag of 
change in credit to 
the private sector to 
GDP  
0.109** 0.051 0.136*** 
One-quarter lag of 
change in M1 to 
GDP 
 0.744  
Two-quarter lag of 
change in M1 to 
GDP 
 1.601***  
Quarterly rate of 
growth of real M1  
  0.072*** 
Nominal exchange 
rate variance 
-0.044** -0.03 -0.053* 
Lagged real 
exchange rate 
4.98 2.19 -7.43 
Lagged inflation 
rate 
0.238* 0.215 0.253 
Argentine crisis -0.012 -0.-033 -0.011 
Brazilian crisis 0.0049 0.009 0.005 
Colombian crisis -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.034*** 
Peruvian crisis -0.048*** -0.027*** -0.049*** 
Chilean crisis -0.026 -0.019 -0.026 
Mexican crisis -0.004 -0.0003 -0.0018 
Constant 0.015 0.009 0.005 
    
No. observations 162 162 162 
Method Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
F-test (p-value) 4.72 (0.000) 5.15 (0.000) 4.06 (0.000) 
R-squared 0.182 0.245 0.22 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
T-statistics computed using robust standard errors. 
Crisis  variables are dummies with value 1 for the four quarters post-crisis, 0 otherwise. 
Regressions include country dummies. 
 
After including a set of standard controlling variables, the estimation presented in 
Column (1) reveals that the growth of the credit to the private sector to GDP at one and 
two lags affects positive and significantly the growth rate of the GDP, the fixed 
investment and the private consumption. 31 Anyway, the quantitative magnitude is 
relatively low. In order to test whether there exists a transactional balances channel, in 
Column (2), the change of M1 to GDP at one and two lags was included. The second lag 
appear to be statistically significant, providing some backing to such hypothesis. As a 
result of the correlation between bank assets and liabilities, these additional variables 
alter the estimated coefficients on credit growth. Therefore, in Column (3), they are 
replaced by the rate of growth of M1 in real terms, which displays a highly significant 
coefficient.  
 
Section 5: Financial crises and long-run economic growth 
 
One perspective missing until this point is the long-run consequences of crises.  A 
myopic focus on the immediate effects, especially when these appear to be less severe 
than expected, might convey a sense of undesirable comfort with the existence and 
recurrence of crises. To assess the long-term effects, an econometric approach will be 
developed next using annual information for 76 countries over the 1966-2001 period, 
with crisis ocurring before 1999 –to allow at least a short time for the crisis to develop- 
according to the Caprio and Klingebiel’s database.32  
 
                                                 
31 In other regressions (not reported) it was included the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation 
of the real exchange rate, but such variables turn out to be statistically not significant in all cases. 
32 See Soto (2003) on the advantages of using annual data to explain long-run economic growth. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Widely used controls are included in the regression.33 Baseline regression (1) shows the 
positive effect of financial deepening on growth found in many previous studies (see for 
example Bebczuk (2002)). In the next column, a dummy variable for financial crises is 
included, taking value 1 during the crisis years following the criterion of Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1999). This is the main variable of interest, and it displays the expected 
negative sign at 1% confidence level. The estimated coefficient indicates that financial 
crises reduce annual long-term growth approximately in one percentage point, 
demonstrating that these episodes are quite traumatic from a long-term standpoint. 
                                                 
33 Dummies for low, middle and high income countries are included but not reported. These variables allow 
to control for different levels of institutional development. A rule of law index yielded similar results. 
Long-run growth effects of financial crises, 1971-2000
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of initial income per capita -0.642*** -0.976*** -0.049 -0.266***
Initial Secondary enrollment -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.065*** -0.068***
Openness to trade 0.012*** 0.0079*** 0.0014 -0.002
Goverment Expenditure to GDP -0.073*** -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.050***
Secondary enrollment 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.074***
Credit to the private sector to GDP 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.021***
Investment rate to GDP 0.179*** 0.182***
Financial crisis -1.069*** -1.032***
Observations 782 782 782 782
Countries 76 76 76 76
Method GMM-system GMM-system GMM-system GMM-system
Sargan Test 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998
Second orden correlation 0.105 0.125 0.095 0.081
Moreover, the inclusion of the crisis variable increases the coefficient on credit to GDP 
by isolating the negative effect of financial deepening via financial crises. 
 
By introducing the investment rate in regression (3) and (4), it is tested whether financial 
crises hit the economy through its impact on the volume of investment.34 Since the 
coefficient on crisis is virtually unchanged in regression (4), it can be claimed that 
financial crises decelerate growth via its effects on the productivity of the economy, 
instead of the more accepted credit story by which crisis-related financial constraints 
limit investment.35 Financial crises distort private sector’s resource allocation by 
interfering in the normal decision making process of banks, firms, and families, who are 
affected by heightened uncertainty, asymmetric information, and coordination problems. 
Compounding the problem, bailout policies are prone to be also inefficient, while 
property rights are in some cases violated in the process.  
 
6. Conclusions and lessons  
 
Against the background of the popular perception that financial crises take a heavy toll on 
the economy, the evidence presented throughout this chapter for Latin American and 
other countries is less apocalyptic. Financial crises hinder economic growth both in short- 
and the long-run, but not at the point of causing per capita GDP to drop. Similar results 
applies for financial intermediation, as real credit and deposits grow at a slower rate after 
the crisis, but financial deepening, as measured by the ratios to GDP, continue to grow, in 
spite that in many cases the financial system keep exhibiting an important degree of 
fragility. One reason for this resiliency of the financial system is that bank instruments 
have no close substitutes in many countries, and savers, especially the unsophisticated 
ones, privilege the simplicity of the contract and the existence of an explicit or implicit 
safety net. 
 
                                                 
34 By the way, it can be noted that the inclusion of the investment rate does not change the estimated 
coefficient on credit to GDP. This suggests that financial development fosters growth by elevating the 
productivity rather than the stock of capital. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find a similar result. 
Moreover, the credit view, according to which the chief detrimental effect of financial 
crises runs through the reduction of aggregate expenditure from a credit constraint, is 
only partially supported by the data, and only in the short-run. Conversely, financial 
crises are harmful owing to the noise they bring into the normal functioning of the 
economy in the form of more uncertainty and asymmetric information problems, 
inadequate government interventions, and the threat to established property rights. These 
phenomena distort the allocation of resources across sectors and periods of time with 
negative consequences for long-term growth prospects. 
 
The low sensitivity of economic activity to sudden swings in credit is striking, though. 
One sensible explanation is that the overall credit-dependency of the non-financial 
private sector is low. This is especially true in developing countries, which are the most 
prone to have financial crisis of an important magnitude. A good measure of credit-
dependency is the proportion of priva te fixed capital accumulation financed with bank 
debt. Bebczuk (2002) shows for a sample of over 40 countries during the 1970-1995 
period that this ratio was just 4.3%. In a way, the probability of crisis is internalized in 
financing decisions within each country. It is not total coincidence that crises are more 
likely in developing countries with small financial systems: debt dependence will tend to 
be low if firms and families are aware of the high probability of crisis and the lack of 
insurance against it.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
35 Backing this assertion, Easterly and Levine (2001) show that physical and human capital accumulation 
are quite stable over time by looking at more than 100 countries.  
36 Countries that suffered a crisis in any year in the 1971-2000 crisis had a credit to GDP ratio of 25.2% in 
1999 against 45% in non-crisis country. 
Data Appendix (to be completed) 
 
 
Country coverage in Section 4: 
 
Argentina (1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995, 2001-), Bolivia (1986-88, 1994-), Brazil (1990, 
1994-1999), Chile (1976, 1981-86), Colombia (1982-1987), Ecuador (1980-1990, 1996-
1997, 1998-2001), El Salvador (1989), Guatemala (1990-2000), Jamaica (1994, 1996-
2000), México (1981-1991, 1994-2000) Nicaragua (1989-1996), Panama (1988-1989), 
Paraguay (1995-2000, 2001-), Peru (1983-1990), Trinidad and Tobago (1982-1993), 
Uruguay (1981-1984, 2001-), Venezuela (1979-1989, 1994-1995), Australia (1989-
1992), Bulgaria (1996-1997), Côte d’Ivoire (1988-1991), Czech Republic (1989-1991),  
Egypt (Early 1980s, 1991-1995), Finland (1991-1994), France (1994-1995), Ghana 
(1982-1989, 1997-), Hungary (1991-1995), Indonesia (194-1995), Japan (1991-) 
Malaysia (1985-1988, 1997-2001), New Zealand (1987-1990), Norway (1990-1993), 
Phillipines (1983-1987, 1998-), Poland (1992-1995), Senegal (1988-1991), Slovenia 
(1992-1994), Korea, Rep. of (1997-2002), Spain (1977-1985), Sri Lanka (1989-1993), 
Sweden (1991-1994), Thailand (1983-1987, 1997-2002) Turkey (1982-1985, 1994) and 
United States (1988-1991). 
 
 
Country coverage in Section 5: 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa 
Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El 
Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zimbabwe. 
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